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THE EROSION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH-THE RIGHT
TO KNOW AND THE INFORMED CONSUMER-
VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY V. VIRGINIA
CITIZENS CONSUMER COUNCIL, INC.
The extent to which the First Amendment protects commercial
speech from state regulation has presented particular problems. How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court recently has afforded purely
commercial speech some degree of protection. In Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,' the Supreme
Court held that a statutory ban on prescription drug price advertising
violated the consumers'2 right to receive information about the cost of
prescription drugs. The Court struck down a Virginia statute that de-
fined as "unprofessional conduct" the advertising of prescription drugs
by any broadcasted or published means.' By holding that consumers
had a constitutional right to receive information concerning a certain
commodity, the Court afforded speech which does "no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction" 4 some level of First Amendment pro-
tection. The Court also recognized that information contained in
advertisements was closely related to that speech which promoted
1. 96 S.Ct. 1817 (1976).
2. All of the plaintiffs were consumers. They included an individual required to take
prescription drugs on a regular basis and two organizations, Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. and the State of Virginia AFL-CIO, whose members were prescription drug
users. There were no pharmacists among the plaintiffs. Id. at 1821 n.10.
3. The statute stated:
Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who...
(3) publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, or in any manner
whatsoever, an amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms
for professional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs which
may be dispensed only by prescription.
VA. CODE ANN. §54-524.35 (1974).
4. 96 S.Ct. at 1826, quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973), where the Court limited the commercial speech doc-
trine's application to economically motivated messages.
5. Additionally, the decision offered structure to an area so muddled as to provoke
confusion and criticism among commentators. See, e.g., Note, Commercial Speech-An
End in Sight to Chrestensen?, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1258 (1974); Comment, The Right to
Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations, 63
GEO. L.J. 775 (1975); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 55, 153-60 (1973);
Comment, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005
(1967).
19761 BOARD OF PHARMACY v. VIRGINIA
"truth, science, morality, and arts, in general . . . ."I Consequently,
the First Amendment was given greater applicability to individuals,
especially consumers.7
Although the decision destroyed a large part of the "commercial
speech" doctrine,' the application of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
has limitations. For instance, a state may regulate the time, place, and
manner of dissemination of the information.9 In addition to establishing
regulations directed at the public's comfort and welfare, the state may
also restrict commercial speech when it interferes with the public safety,
as in the case of an advertisement that encourages the violation of
legitimate statutes and ordinances. 0 Furthermore, Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy does not extend constitutional protection to advertise-
ments that are "false or misleading in any way."'1 Therefore, regulations
6. 96 S.Ct. at 1826, quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1976). The Court
in Roth discussed the general types of speech that would be afforded First Amendment
protection.
7. The Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy recognized the important role that
commercial advertising might play in aiding the public to make knowledgeable decisions
about matters which affect its well-being. 96 S.Ct. at 1826. See text accompanying notes
79-86 infra. See also Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971); Comment,
The First Amendment and Consumer Protection: Commercial Advertising as Protected
Speech, 50 ORE. L. REV. 177 (1971).
8. The commercial speech doctrine had its genesis in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52 (1942). There, the Court ruled that an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of pam-
phlets did not violate the First Amendment when applied to commercial messages. Since
that decision, there has been no First Amendment protection for advertisements which
promote a purely business transaction. See text accompanying notes 16-21 infra. For a
history of the development of the commercial speech doctrine, see Note, Professional Price
Advertising Set Free?-Consumers' "Right-to-Know" In Prescription Drug Price Adver-
tising: Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 373
F. Supp. 6&3 (W.D. Va. 1974), 8 CONN. L. REV. 108 (1975).
9. 96 S.Ct. at 1830, citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-
87 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 308 (1940).
10. Cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973) There, the Court ruled that employment advertisements arranged in sex designated
columns were commercial speech and thus could be regulated. In support of its conclusion,
the Court, in dicta, commented on the advertisements' encouragement of sex discrimina-
tion in hiring practices, an activity prohibited by a city ordinance. See text accompanying
notes 23-34 infra.
11. The Court emphasized that "untruthful speech ... has never been protected for
its own sake," indicating that a very strong purpose for allowing deceptive speech would
have to be established before a statute regulating it would be overruled. 96 S.Ct. at 1830-
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of deceptive advertising are still constitutionally acceptable.' 2 The re-
strictions on commercial speech recognized as permissible by the Court
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy very closely resemble those which
may be placed on traditionally protected speech.' 3 Thus, the Court cor-
rectly recognized that a message concerning commercial transactions
might contain important information needed to enable the members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their times.'4
This Note will outline the history of the commercial speech doctrine,
describe and evaluate the future First Amendment standard to be ap-
plied to commercial advertising, and discuss the ramifications of
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy on First Amendment freedoms. Prior
to its decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court
had been reluctant to give pure commercial speech any degree of First
Amendment protection.' 5 In Valentine v. Chrestensen,' the Court ruled
that an ordinance prohibiting distribution of handbills did not violate
the advertiser's First Amendment right to speak when it was applied to
the promotion of a purely commercial transaction.'7 Even though
Valentine seemed to have excluded commercial messages from constitu-
tional considerations, subsequent decisions failed to clarify the perime-
ters of commercial speech.'" The Court developed an approach whereby
it examined the purpose of the speech in order to determine whether the
speech fell within protected bounds."' Where the purpose of the adver-
12. Id. at 1830 n.24. See also Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion for an extensive
discussion of the decision's limitations in the area of deceptive advertising. Id. at 1832-
35.
13. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding an ordinance
that prohibited picketing "which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace and good order of
(a) school session . . ."); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding an ordinance
that prohibited the use of sound trucks on public streets); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558 (1948) (holding that an ordinance that required the speaker to obtain a permit before
he could use a sound truck was unconstitutional but acknowledging that the "hours and
place of public discussion can be controlled").
14. 96 S.Ct. at 1825, citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
15. See notes 18-37 and accompanying text infra.
16. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
17. Id. at 54.
18. After Valentine, some paid-for advertisements were afforded First Amendment pro-
tection. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a
paid for political advertisement was not commercial speech); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943) (holding that the sale of religious books and pamphlets was not a
business transaction which could be regulated by an ordinance); Jamison v. Texas, 318
U.S. 413 (1943) (holding that the distribution of handbills advertising the sale of religious
books was not a purely commercial advertisement and could not be regulated).
19. This approach is sometimes referred to as the "primary purpose" or "motive" test.
See Comment, The Right to Recieve, supra note 5, at 794 n.122.
[Vol. 26:134
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tisement was primarily economic the Court invariably granted little or
no First Amendment protection."0 On the other hand, if the advertiser's
motive was to disseminate information regarding government, religion,
or other areas of public concern, the message was afforded full First
Amendment protection.2 This approach created confusion concerning
the commercial speech doctrine and the validity of the Valentine deci-
sion.2"
Two of the latest Supreme Court decisions, Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations" and Bigelow v. Virginia,24
failed to clarify the standard to be used in the commercial speech area.
In Pittsburgh Press, the Court faced the question of whether First
Amendment protection would extend to a newspaper that published
employment advertisements in sex designated columns." In refusing to
extend the requested protection to the Pittsburgh Press Company, the
20. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (holding that door-to-door
soliciting of secular magazine subscriptions was commercial speech).
21. See note 18 supra.
22. Although the practice of classifying the advertiser's purpose appeared to give some
structure to the area, in reality, there was disagreement among the members of the Court
concerning the scope of the commercial speech doctrine. For example, in Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), five members held that the city was not obliged
to sell advertising space on mass transit vehicles to a candidate for public office. However,
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for four dissenters, wrote:
While it is possible that commercial advertising may be accorded less First
Amendment protection than speech concerning political and social issues of
public importance, it is 'speech' nonetheless, often communicating information
and ideas found by many . . . persons to be controversial.
Id. at 314 (citations omitted).
23. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
24. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
25. The Pennsylvania court interpreted the Human Relations Ordinance of the City of
Pittsburgh to forbid newspapers from publishing job advertisements which requested that
the position be filled by a person of a particular gender. 413 U.S. at 378. Section 8 of the
ordinance provided that it was unlawful:
(a) For any employer to refuse to hire any person or otherwise discriminate
against any person with respect to hiring . . . because of . . . sex.
(e) For any 'employer,' employment agency or labor organization to publish
or circulate, or to cause to be published or circulated, any notice or advertise-
ment relating to 'employment' or membership which indicates a discrimination
because of . . .sex.
(j) For any person, whether or not an employer, employment agency or labor
organization, to aid . . . in the doing of any act declared to be an unlawful
employment practice by this ordinance. . ..
Pittsburgh, Pa., Human Relations Ordinance 395, §8 (1969), amending Pittsburgh, Pa.,
Human Relations Ordinance 75, §8 (1967) (amended ordinance cited in 413 U.S. 376, 378
(1973)).
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Court reasoned that the job advertisements were commercial in nature.2
In addition, the decision noted that sex discrimination in employment
was prohibited by an ordinance 7 and that unlawful conduct could not
claim constitutional protection." However, the Court did recognize in
dictum that not all commercial speech was unprotected. 21
Two years after Pittsburgh Press," the Court was called upon again
to define commercial speech. In Bigelow v. Virginia," a newspaper edi-
tor was convicted for violating a Virginia statute 2 outlawing advertise-
ments that aided in procuring legal abortions.3 The Court struck down
the statute on the basis of the First Amendment, finding that the adver-
tisement was more than commercial speech. 4 The advertisement in-
volved a topic in which the public was deeply concerned and on which
the state had little authority to regulate.3 5 Thus, as in prior decisions, 31
a message closely related to traditionally protected areas was protected
by the First Amendment. 37 The Court in Bigelow, however, declined the
26. The Court stated:
In the crucial respects, the advertisements in the present record resemble the
Chrestensen rather than the Sullivan advertisement. None expresses a position
on whether, as a matter of social policy, certain positions ought to be filled by
members of one or the other sex, nor does any of them criticize the Ordinance
or the Commission's enforcement practices. Each is no more than a proposal of
possible employment. The advertisements are thus examples of commercial
speech.
413 U.S. at 385.
27. See note 25 supra.
28. 413 U.S. at 388-89.
29. Id. at 384, citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court
recognized that paid-for advertisements which convey a political or religious message are
entitled to First Amendment protection. See note 18 supra.
30. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
31. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
32. The statute under which Bigelow was charged provided:
If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circula-
tion of any publication, or in any manner, encourages or prompts the procuring
of an abortion of miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
VA. CODE ANN. §18.1-63 (1960). The statute has since been repealed by Va. Act of Assem-
bly 1975, cc. 14, 15.
33. Bigelow published an advertisement which gave information about legal abortions
in New York and solicited subscribers to abortion referral agencies. 421 U.S. at 811-12.
34. Id. at 822.
35. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 176 (1973).
36. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
37. In Bigelow, little deference was given to the language in Pittsburgh Press which
indicated that commercial advertising is unprotected. The Court interpreted the commer-
cial aspects of the Pittsburgh Press advertisements' lack of protection only in terms of
their illegality. The Court concluded that ". . . the advertisements would have received
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invitation to give constitutional protection to all commercial speech,
although it did recognize that advertisements might provide the public
with legitimate information." As a result, after Pittsburgh Press and
Bigelow, the degree of protection afforded to commercial speech was still
unclear. 9
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court searched for a stan-
some degree of First Amendment protection if the commercial proposal had been legal."
421 U.S. at 821.
38. The Court in Bigelow stated:
To the extent that commercial acitivity is subject to regulation, the relationship
of speech to that activity may be one factor, among others to consider in weigh-
ing the First Amendment interest against the governmental interest alleged.
Advertising is not thereby stripped of all First Amendment protection. The
relationship of speech to the marketplace of products of services does not make
it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.
Id. at 826.
39. An indication of the confusion in the area appeared in several lower court decisions.
When presented with the question whether prescription drug advertising could be prohib-
ited by statute, these courts searched for a standard which would be acceptable under the
commercial speech doctrine. Frequently, statutes prohibiting prescription drug price ad-
vertising were found to violate the advertiser's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
See, e.g., Florida Bd. of Pharmacy v. Wells' City, Inc., 219 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1969); Stadnick
v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1962); Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Say-A-Lot
Inc., 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d 974 (1973). Contra, Supermarkets General Corp. v. Sills, 93
N.J. Super. 326, 225 A.2d 728 (1966); Urowsky v. Bd. of Regents, 46 App. Div. 2d 974,
362 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1974); cf. Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94
(N.D. Cal. 1975) (statute invalid because it infringed on consumers' First Amendment
rights).
The due process approach consisted of an examination of the statutory purpose and the
means employed to accomplish it. The courts required that the means bear a rational
relation to the legislative purpose. Consequently, where the prohibition of the advertise-
ment bore no rational relation to the states' purposes, the courts concluded that it violated
the advertiser's due process rights. The courts found that the control of misuse and over-
consumption of drugs were directly regulated by other statutes and professional regula-
tions.
In addition, the courts noted factors which removed the constraint on drug price infor-
mation even farther from the legislative purpose. Finding that the majority of drug users
were among the aged and infirm and least able to attain the desired information by other
means, the courts concluded that the health and welfare of the states' citizens was in fact
detrimentally affected by advertising prohibitions.
The use of a due process analysis was not novel in decisions responding to issues con-
cerning regulations of professionals. In fact, that was the most common approach. See,
e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963) (holding
that a statute that prohibited advertising by optometrists did not violate an optometrist's
due process rights); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (holding that a statute
which prevented opticians from fitting eyeglasses did not violate an optician's due process
rights); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (holding
that a statute which prohibited advertising by dentists did not violate a dentist's due
process rights).
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dard to be applied in the commercial speech area."' In so doing it
weighed the interests of the three parties affected by the Virginia stat-
ute. Considering, first, the interest of the pharmacist in advertising, the
Court concluded that although it was primarily economic, and thus less
weighty than other interests, that factor alone would not be sufficient
to deny First Amendment protection." Greater emphasis was placed on
the consumer's right to receive information, 2 and consideration was
given to all factors which made the consumer's need for drug price
information more acute. 3 Finally, in weighing the state's interest, the
Court examined the articulated purposes of the statute. They were: 1)
maintenance of professionalism among pharmacists; and 2) pharma-
cists' monitoring of consumers' drug needs." Although the Court ac-
cepted the purposes of the statute, it found the regulations to be too far
removed from the legislative purpose in light of the First Amendment
interest being asserted.' The decision noted that there were other regu-
lations which controlled a pharmacist's professional conduct and the
danger of the consumer's misuse of drugs." After an examination of the
three interests involved, the Court concluded that the consumers' inter-
est in receiving drug price information, together with the pharmacists'
economic interests, outweighed the paternalistic purposes of the stat-
ute. 7 Recognizing a First Amendment interest on the part of the con-
sumer, the Court established a balancing of interests test as the consti-
tutional standard to be employed in the area of commercial speech.6
The balancing of interests test established by the Court in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy is significant in that it allows courts to exam-
ine factors other than the bare message of the speech when evaluating
the listener's interests. 9 In the past, the outcome of a case rested upon
40. 96 S.Ct. at 1825.
41. Id. at 1826.
42. Id. at 1826-27.
43. The Court considered such factors as the discrepancy in drug prices in small geo-
graphic areas, the social and economic status of the litigants, and the important part that
the information played in the health and welfare of the prescription drug users. Id.
44. Id. at 1828-29.
45. Id. at 1829.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1829-30.
48. Id. at 1826-29.
49. The Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy stated:
As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial informa-
tion, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the
day's most urgent political debate. Appellees' case in this respect is a convincing
one. Those whom the suppression of prescription drug price information hits the
hardest are the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged. A disproportionate
[Vol. 26:134
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whether the speech was purely commercial." Using such an analysis, the
Court was required to look at the content of the message in order to
determine its nature. However, in all areas related to freedom of expres-
sion, content examination has been held to be a practice repugnant to
the First Amendment.51 By placing the listener's interest in balance with
those of the state, the Court has developed a method whereby the con-
tent of the advertisement will be viewed only indirectly. This approach
more closely complies with traditional First Amendment requirements.
Some form of balancing of interests test is always used in First
Amendment analysis. Both the "clear and present danger" 5 and the
"compelling state interest"5 3 tests require the court to weigh First
Amendment interests against those asserted by the state. In addition,
when a First Amendment violation is asserted in a due process and equal
protection context, a balancing of interests is required. 5 Where a state
statute allegedly violates a fundamental interest, the court rigidly ex-
amines the statute.5 The statutory means must bear a very close rela-
amount of their income tends to be spent on prescription drugs; yet they are the
least able to learn, by shopping from pharmacist to pharmacist, where their
scarce dollars are best spent. When drug prices vary as strikingly as they do,
information as to who is charging what becomes more than a convenience. It
could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities.
96 S.Ct. at 1826-27.
50. See notes 18-22 and accompanying text supra.
51. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (holding that an
ordinance prohibiting the exhibition of films based on their content violated the First
Amendment); Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (holding that an ordinance which
described permissible picketing based on the subject of the protest violated the First
Amendment); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that a statute which
prohibited "offensive conduct" violated the First Amendment because offenses would be
determined by defining and classifying the expression). See also Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 589 (1969); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
52. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
53. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (freedom of speech);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (freedom of speech); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (freedom of religion); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)
(freedom of association); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) (right of
association).
54. See note 53 supra.
55. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972), for a discussion
of those interests which are found to be "fundamental" and the level of scrutiny to be
applied. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (defining privacy as a
fundamental interest requiring strict scrutiny of a statute which may infringe upon it);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 499 (1958) (defining association as a fundamental interest
requiring strict scrutiny of a statute which may infringe upon it).
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tion to the legislative purpose, and only the most compelling state inter-
est will be sufficient to uphold a statute that infringes upon a fundamen-
tal interest. 6 The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court employed an
analysis analogous to this approach.
In the past, when commercial advertisements were not afforded First
Amendment protection, suits attacking state regulation of professional
advertising had been analyzed in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause. 7 For the most part, due process claims were pre-
sented by the professional seeking to advertise his services."0 The courts
resolved the issue using traditional due process rationale and deferred
to the states' legislatures for an applicable solution to the problem..5 9
First Amendment violations were not asserted"' and consequently, the
courts were not obliged to examine that issue or to scrutinize the stat-
utes in question.
In contrast, the plaintiffs in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy alleged
a violation of the First Amendment: the right to receive information was
restricted by the statute. The Court, after acknowledging the legitimacy
of that interest,"' proceeded to evaluate the statute using a more rigid
scrutiny than is customarily employed in cases which do not involve a
fundamental interest.2 The Court found on "close inspection" that
"[t]he advertising ban does not directly affect professional standards
one way or the other." 3 By requiring that the means adopted"1 by the
legislature bear a close relationship to the statute's purpose, 5 the Court
demanded that the statute regulate with narrow specificity. Therefore,
56. See Dun v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). See also note 66
infra.
57. See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963);
Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935). See also note 39
supra.
58. See note 57 supra.
59. See Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. at 432 n.12;
Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. at 611-12.
60. In Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, the plaintiff alleged a First
Amendment violation. However, it was not timely and the Court declined to examine the
issue. 374 U.S. at 432 n.12.
61. 96 S.Ct. at 1822-23.
62. Compare Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963),
and Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935), with New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
63. 96 S.Ct. at 1829.
64. The means employed in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy was prohibition of advertis-
ing by pharmacists. Id.
65. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
66. 96 S.Ct. at 1829-30. Requiring that legislation be precisely drawn and narrowly
[Vol. 26:134
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with commercial advertisements as well as with messages of a political
or religious objective, a statute must be drawn in such a way that it
minimally restrains the free flow of information. By examining the stat-
ute in this way, the Court exacted a criteria for commercial speech
similar to that commonly required in traditionally protected areas.
However, the Court did not employ a traditional First Amendment
analysis. Virginia was not required to show a compelling interest in
upholding the regulation of speech. 7 Although the importance of the
consumers' First Amendment interest was acknowledged, " the Court
employed a simple balancing test requiring that the regulation be given
"close inspection" rather than rigid scrutiny. Formerly, there appeared
to be two levels of speech: that which received constitutional protection
and that which did not." The former was given full First Amendment
protection requiring rigid examination of a statute allegedly infringing
upon free speech. The latter was given no protection and First Amend-
ment claims were summarily disposed of. By employing a standard of
"close inspection," the decision produced an intermediate tier of exami-
nation in the First Amendment area dependent upon the classification
of the speech in question. Thus, although commercial speech was found
to be protected, it was not entitled to the same level of protection given
to speech of a political or religious nature.
A problem arises when courts are obliged to categorize the message
in order to deduce the level of protection to be afforded. Some content
examination will be necessary. Therefore, even though the approach
used in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy allows the interest of the
listener a broader scope by recognizing factors other than the bare mes-
sage,71 it may have the same effect as the "primary purpose" test72 in
tailored is a typical First Amendment approach. By exacting such measures, the Court
views the possibility of First Amendment infringement as minimal. See, e.g., NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
67. Compare Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 96 S.Ct. 1817 (1976), with Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972), and United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
68. 96 S.Ct. at 1829.
69. See Redish, supra note 7, at 431 for the proposition that a second tier already exists
in the First Amendment area which includes speech that is not protected, such as
obscenity, "fighting words," and certain forms of libel.
70. See the dissent of Mr. Justice Stewart in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations where he warns of the emergence of this kind of analysis.
"So long as Members of this Court view the First Amendment as no more than a set of
,values' to be balanced against other 'values,' that Amendment will remain in grave
jeopardy." 413 U.S. 376, 402 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
71. See note 43 supra.
72. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
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its liberal allowance of content examination.
Despite the possible problematic effects, Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy nevertheless enhances the scope of the First Amendment in
that it gives standing to the receiver of information and affords constitu-
tional protection for speech pertaining to commercial transactions.
Since the adoption of the First Amendment, great importance has been
placed on the right to receive information."3 Although several cases have
contained language acknowledging the rights of the listener, 74 the Su-
preme Court has never held that such a right is embodied in that
amendment. 75 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the plaintiffs had
a significant interest 7" in receiving information about the price of pre-
scription drugs and were detrimentally affected by the Virginia stat-
ute. 77 By granting standing to these litigants the Court placed its impri-
matur on the right to receive information as the legitimate partner of
the right to speak.7 1
In addition, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy will promote some
purposes of the First Amendment on an economic level.7" First Amend-
73. See Letters from James Madison to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, in 3 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 276 (1865), where James Madison stated: "A popular
Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue
to a farce or tragedy; or both." Justice Cardozo also commented on the importance of the
right to receive, stating:
There is no freedom without choice, and there is no choice without
knowledge,-or none that is not illusory. Implicit, therefore, in the very notion
of liberty is the liberty of the mind to absorb and to beget . . . . At the root of
all liberty is liberty to know.
B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 104 (1928).
74. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,
395 U.S. 367 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen.,
381 U.S. 301 (1965).
75. See Redish, supra note 7; Comment, The Right to Receive, supra note 5, at 777-93;
Comment, Freedom to Hear: A Political Justification of the First Amendment, 46 WASH.
L. REV. 311 (1971). Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy also indicated that the right to receive has never been acknowledged as a full
First Amendment freedom. He stated that the ruling "extends standing to raise First
Amendment claims beyond the previous decisions of this Court." 96 S.Ct. at 1835.
76. In order to have standing in a federal court, a party must allege "such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for illumina-
tion of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
77. In order to gain standing in a federal court, a party must allege "injury in fact."
Singleton v. Wulff, 96 S.Ct. 875 (1976); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 96
S.Ct. 917 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
78. 96 S.Ct. at 1823 ("If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive
the advertising, and it may be asserted by these appellees"). See also id. at 1823 n.15.
79. See T. EMERSON, TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966).
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ment freedoms are more likely to be couched in terms of political or
social debates;"" however, there are pragmatic reasons for extending its
protection to commercial exchange.' Wide dissemination of information
concerning products will inform the public of available choices. In many
ways, decisions about which product will be more serviceable or which
will carry the greatest economic benefits can more intimately affect an
individual than which candidate will be elected to public office.82 In
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy," the Court recognized the
importance of the consumer's interest in attaining information neces-
sary to make an educated choice and to have real options from which
to choose. Additionally, both the Court and commentators 4 have noted
the importance of advertising because of its far-reaching and inexpen-
sive manner of placing facts about products before the public.
Another function of advertising is that it creates needs." As a result
of a wide dissemination of commercial information, the public will be
educated about new products and services."' Although a more comforta-
ble life-style may not be a primary goal of the First Amendment, it is
at least a benefit that might be derived from this new application of the
amendment to commercial advertising. In holding that commercial
speech is entitled to constitutional protection, the decision broadened
the First Amendment's scope and extended its purposes to the "market-
place of products."
Rita M. Novak
Professor Emerson defines two purposes of the First Amendment as the attainment of
truth, id. at 7, and individual self-fulfillment. Id. at 4.
80. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 55 (1965); Meiklejohn, The First Amend-
ment Is An Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255 (1961).
81. See note 7 supra.
82. See note 49 supra.
83. 96 S.Ct. at 1827. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 826. See also Goldfarb v.
Virginia Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), where the Court invalidated a price schedule for lawyers
basing its decision on the important role lawyers play in commercial exchange. See
generally Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH TODAY 33 (1941).
84. See 96 S.Ct. at 1827; Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection
of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948); Kaufman, The Medium, The Message and
the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1970).
85. See Brown, supra note 84, at 1168.
86. See Brown, supra note 84; Comment, The First Amendment and Consumer
Protection, supra note 7.
87. 96 S.Ct. at 1825.
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